A BRIEF HISTORY AND THEORY OF NOT LOOKING: TOWARD A FIELD THEORY OF THE AUDIOVISUAL

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During the 1960s, the constructivist approach to vision and visuality broke free from the dominant culturally and historically relative models (as championed within Semiotics and Feminist theory) to involve the human agency of the body thus proposing a biological model of vision. The Biological framing of vision attempted to discard a culturally and historically relative model of vision in favour of models which involved the body as a site of meaning, thus bringing the body back into the framing of vision, taken away by the previous linguistic turn. Within this biological framework, it is the whole body that supports and maintains the spectacle of vision. However, within Ecological and Enactive approaches to perception, it is argued that perception is not embedded in or constrained by either the body or the surrounding world, but together in a reciprocal, emergent specification and selection. A biological model of vision then must move beyond the body or the environment to involve an enactive approach to vision, that neither privileges the body or the environment. This paper addresses the authors' insight into the implications of an enacted cognition (and visions role within such a system) on traditional views of vision from constructivist, biological and phenomenological standpoint and its implications to the visual arts. It traces the conceptions of vision historically from a linguistically defined culturally relative model of the early 1960s, through a constructivist biological model of the late 1960s, which focussed on the body as the site of meaning, to Recent enacted models of perception, that privilege neither the body or the environment as a site of meaning. The Enacted model is unpacked and a model of perception in which the role of vision, and thus its very nature, is questioned and established.

Introduction

This paper addresses the author's insight into the implications of an enacted model of perception and cognition, in particular the role of 'vision' within such a system, on traditional views of vision, and how the term 'visual' is to be understood in light of such enacted models. It is argued that in light of the enacted models of perception, models of vision (or looking) that have existed

prior to enacted models, such as culturally relative (Mulvey 1975) and biological (Bryson 1989, Gombrich 1960) privileging either a linguistic cultural layer or the body as a site of meaning, respectively, lack a fundamental move toward an enacted model of perception and vision which privileges neither. This paper's focus is to outline a model of enacted 'looking' that it argues opens our eyes to the ways that have prevented us from looking for so long. Drawing from constructivist, biological and phenomenological standpoints, it traces the conceptions of vision historically, starting from the linguistically defined, culturally relative models of the early 1960`s, in which culturally defined models of vision and the visual, such as Laura Mulvey's male gaze (Mulvey 1975), assume a model of vision and visual perception to be constructed from social/cultural codes and signs, such as feminine sexuality, shaping perceptions and representations of reality. The culturally relative models are later denounced by a constructivist view of vision, in which a biological framing of vision was proposed (championed by Ernst Gombrich and Norman Bryson), focussed on bringing the body back in the frame as the site of meaning in itself, which was disembodied and forgotten through focus on language of the cultural relative models. With support by phenomenological models of vision drawn from the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty during the late 1960s, the biological models took vision away from the objective clutches of the cultural and social theorists, that had shaped perception and vision to this point, and re-instated the body as an active site of meaning in the structuring of visual representation. The focus then shifts to recent enacted models of perception, (such as Varela 2001) in which it is maintained that within human perception we cannot privilege either the body or the environment as an independent site of meaning, but must attend to both as a reciprocal specification. The enacted models present an intriguing model for the visual arts, in which the role of vision itself, and its very nature within such a system, needs to be questioned and rethought to move beyond the biological framing proposed by the constructivists. As such, this paper insights a move from the 'visual' as known through current models of vision, toward a theoretical enacted model, in the process reclassifying the notion of the 'visual' and the nature of 'vision' within this enacted structure, which will be outlined here as the 'audiovisual'.

Looking and the Visual

During the 1960s, active constructivist artists and academics set about to challenge a rising dominant linguistic model of visual experience and visuality that saw perception (specifically models of the visual and visuality) as being shaped by socially defined cultural codes. The cultural relativity and historicity of vision thesis has become a widely accepted axiom for visual

studies and art history since the philosophical Linguistic Turn of the early 20th Century, championed by the rise of social studies, feminist theories and semiotics (Kesner 2009, pp.266-273). Within the culturally relative thesis, visual perception is seen to be conventionally, historically and socially constructed as part of a linguistic based conception of reality. These relative models of vision, such as Laura Mulvey's *Male Gaze* (Mulvey 1975) which argues that the gender determined Hegemonic *Male Gaze* of early Hollywood cinema is founded through culturally constructed codes of Sex, Femininity and spectatorship (Mulvey 1975), shape visual perceptions and representations of reality. In such a model, Mulvey argued, the female appearance within early cinema was coded in such a way to connote a *to-be-looked-at-ness* through strong visual and erotic impact they portray on screen (Mulvey 1975), thus moulding a representation of reality in which the female appearance plays to the male gaze, placing the spectator in the seat of a masculine subject position. Such culturally relative Theories assumed that vision and visuality have a culturally defined history; that there exists specific culturally and historically constructed modes of perception, that are virtually undisputed in disciplines concerned with visual experience (Kesner 2009). As such, the relative models see visual experience as being constructed as part of a set of cultural and historical codes that exist independently of direct human perception, shaping human perception and representations of reality to be linguistically defined.

The relativity of vision thesis was strongly contested by constructivist theorists such as Ernst Gombrich and Nelson Goodman during the late 1960`s, at a time when major advancements in the Biological Sciences had begun to build Biological models of the mind. Questions began to arise about the possibility of a Biological foundation to perception, the arts and experience itself. In particular, Ernst Gombrich amassed overwhelming evidence to show how the way we see and depict depends upon and varies with experience, practice, interests and attitudes (Goodman 1968) Gombrich focussed on the intentionality and desire of human nature, and as such, took exception to the assumption that we can construct vision independently of our own biological `nature`, and championed a biological framing of vision, and what he calls human `Nature`, that he argued lies beyond the culturally relative thesis. Gombrich maintained that the use and critique of cultural codes has shaped our perception of, and representations of, reality through vision thus ignoring the Biological foundations of vision, itself rooted within our own bodily experiences. (Gombrich 1960) To Gombrich, there can be no *'innocent eye'*, (Gombrich 1960, p.307) no eye that is merely passive in its perception of cultural codes, the eye is always historical and relative to the body that it belongs to, to its own biology, and perception is no different. He set out to rethink the issue of conventionality and historicity of vision and visuality itself from biological foundations, thus moving beyond the

Culturally Relative thesis. This notion in subsequent years, however, became a target of major criticism and regarded as irrelevant by those who followed critical studies, feminism and semiotics that were steadily advancing the case for the relativism and social determination of vision. (Kesner 2009) With this large advancement in the cultural relative stance, the `natural` biological models championed by Gombrich and Bryson, became more and more irrelevant as they ignored the fundamental culturally deterministic nature of the popular relative models. In the 1990s, Gombrich began to openly denounce cultural relativism, which he saw as plaguing humanities and cultural studies, in which he begins to openly argue the problem of the Relativity of vision in light of a theory of the biological foundation to art;

> Our Biological inheritance consists less of overt traits than of dispositions which can be developed or atrophied in the life of the community [...] I am convinced that the visual arts rest in similar ways to Biological Functions. (Gombrich 1987 pp.695-696; cited in Kesnar 2009)

It is the very question, of the biological rooting of vision, that was a major focus of the art historian Norman Bryson in his book 'Vision and Painting`. Bryson too, found issue with the cultural relativity of vision and visuality, claiming that the act of vision / visuality or *looking*, must amount to more than the sum of a coded system signs can reveal, it is rooted, supported by and contingent to the whole of the body`s experience. In his critique of the reductive nature of painting and vision within Western painting, (Bryson 1989) he sets out a clear division between our mediated way of looking at the world through a Gaze, and our `natural`, biological method of the Glance;

> The logic of the Gaze is subject to two great laws. The body (of the painter, of the viewer) is reduced to a single point, the macula of retinal surface; and the moment of the gaze is placed outside duration. Spatially and temporally the act of viewing is constructed as a removal of the dimensions of space and time, as a disappearance of the body. (Bryson 1989, p.96)

Bryson sets up the Gaze as his reading of the cultural relativist model, the Gaze (a linguistically constrained model) reduces the moment of experience, what he calls the *Deixis* – a carnal form that points back directly to the bodily experience of the perceiver (Bryson 1989, p.88), and places it outside of the direct bodily experience of space and duration, thus removing the body as a site of meaning;

> Western Painting is predicated on the disavowal of deictic reference on the disappearance of the body as site of meaning. (Bryson 1989, p.89)

Bryson argues that this disappearance of the body, and the subsequent suppression of Deixis, operates by abstracting from the physical practice of painting (and of viewing) to the linguistic code, severing the body from its labour; the body is reduced to an optical autonomy. Thus, viewing through the Gaze is constructed outside of the viewers / painters own dimensions of space and time, it becomes a cultural code, losing its original Deicitc (or carnal) references and ignoring the body as a site of meaning in itself. In contrast, the concept of the Glance aims to put the body, complete with its own dimensions of space and time, back into the picture. In contrast, the 'Painting of the Glance addresses vision in the durational temporality of the viewing subject, it does not seek to bracket out the process of viewing nor [..] does it exclude the traces of the body of labour' (Bryson 1989, p.94)

The Glance addresses vision as a part of the durational temporality of the subject, and is indistinguishable from it. The Glance is a sideways look from an always passing viewer, whose attention is always elsewhere. It is a glance at a world thorough a body that is existing in its own space and time, for itself, and as such, has its own Deixis, its own reading. Against the Gaze, the Glance proposes desire, it proposes the body, in the duration of its practical activity (Bryson 1989, p.122), and these are the terms that the tradition of the Gaze seeks to suppress. It is the painting/viewing of the Glance, as appose to the Gaze, that points to a biological foundation of vision; one that is not detached from the body's duration and temporality, one that is contingent to its techniques and does not exclude any trace of its labour.

Resting upon a relativity of vision thesis, it is clear that from the suggested biologically focussed standpoint that vision and the visual lie beyond a cultural and historical determination. To focus upon a cultural relative model of vision is to deny the body`s own temporality and existence in structuring vision. Within this framework, the act of looking becomes akin to tunnel vision, a focussing on a subject whilst filtering out the surrounding `goings on` of the body`s existence and temporality. In understanding vision in a culturally relative framework, the eye becomes dis-embodied, the bodily act of the Glance, and the structuring of vision within this bodily act, is reduced to that of the Gaze in which the body, with its own temporality and history, disappears. We cannot, then, understand the complex sense we have of our environment purely through the activity of the disembodied eye of cultural relativism.

The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty argues such, that `looking` must be fully integrated within the kinaesthetic and tactile dimensions of experience;

> Our own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism; it keeps the visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into it...and with it forms a system. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p.235)

To Merleau-Ponty the body in the world supports and maintains the spectacle of vision. Vision cannot be detached from the sensing body in its world as a system; as such vision cannot be dis-embodied and understood in isolation from the system, as the system itself maintains it. Vision then is more than just the visual, it the aural, it is the tactile, it is the kinaesthetic, it is the temporal. Vision is supported by the rest of the sensing body; to look is to experience with all your being. The body is fundamental to systems of `natural` looking, to Glancing. The mediation of our experience through culturally relative models of vision, remove the active body from the dimension of vision and the visual. To deny the body its role in looking is to view the world through a tunnel vision, to detach the eye from its tactile and temporal bodily existence.

The constructivist approach to vision aimed to break from a culturally relative model of vision and pull it back to involve human agency involved with a *biologically rooted model* of vision. The biological framing of vision (proposed by Gombrich and Bryson) attempted to discard a culturally and historically relative model of vision in favour of a triadic model that was rooted within the biological nature of human existence which involved the body as a site of meaning. Within this framework it is the body that supports and maintains the spectacle of vision, a body that constitutes much more than the visual – a synaesthtetic model of vision. However, within ecological and enactive approaches to perception, (Stoffregen 2003, Varela et al. 1993) it is argued that perception is not embedded in or constrained by either the body or the surrounding world, but together in a reciprocal, emergent specification and selection. A biological model of vision, then, must move beyond the body to involve an enactive approach to vision, that neither privileges the body or the environment.

Looking beyond the Visual

The enactive approach to perception (Varela et al. 1993) maintains that perception and action (sensory and motor processes of the whole body) are fundamentally inseparable within lived cognition, the action of the whole body in the environment structures perception and cognition. Its roots can be traced back to the Aristolean notion of ‘Aisthesis’, in which it is argued that a

'more balanced attention be paid to all our corporeal sensorial sensations in daily life, not merely the (audio-) visual' (Verrips 2006, p 29). Such models of perception do not privilege any of the sense faculties over any other; instead, the individual senses are re-categorised and put on the same plane of importance, forming an indivisible whole in which they are all considered equal. Re-considered from the point of view of their interplay, the sensation of touch is considered to be the most fundamental of the 'senseations', (Aristotle 1986, p.183) as it not only forms the conditions of our survival (reproduction and defence), but can also be traced to be associated with all the other senses[1]. Jojada Verrips (2006) recognises the tactile nature of perception as a whole, taking this notion of Aisthesis in its original form to argue that if we were to pay attention to our entire sense experience rather than the Western dominance of the (audio-)visual, we would discover that our experience is predominately tactile in nature, that our whole sense experience is reducible to tactility (Verrips 2006). The Enactive approach to perception, resting upon similar ground, recognises this tactility of the body and also incorporates the subsequent external influences of the environment upon the tactile body. This approach consists of two main points: (1) that Perception consists in perceptually guided action and that (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensi-motor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided (Varela et al. 1993). The action of the tactile body *in* the world guides perception, and this `enaction`, forms our basic cognitive structures. The enactive approach to perception is a reciprocal specification of organism and environment, the tactility of the environment and the body as a whole form this specification, this was a central insight in Merleau-Ponty`s early works, in which:

> [...] The properties of the object and the intentions of the subject [...] are not only intermingled: they constitute a new whole. When the eye and the ear follow an animal in flight, it is impossible to say `which started first` in the exchange of stimuli and responses. Since all movements of the organism are always conditioned by external influences, one can, if one wishes, readily treat behaviour as an effect of the mileau. But in the same way, since all the stimulations which the organism receives have in turn been possible only by its proceeding movements which have culminated

[1] Aristotle, De-Anima (On the Soul) 'Hence it is that taste also must be a sort of touch, because it is the sense for which is tangible and nutritious' (Aristotle 1986, p.601). 'I call by the name of special object of this or that sense that which cannot be perceived by any other sense than that one and in respect of which no error is possible; in this sense colour is the special object of sight, sound of hearing, flavour of taste. Touch, indeed, discriminates more than one set of different qualities' (Aristotle 1986, p.567)

> in exposing the receptor organ to external influences, one could also say that behaviour is the first cause of all stimulations. Thus the form of the excitant is created by the organism itself, by its proper manner of offering itself to actions from the outside.[...] The environment emerges from the world through the actualisation or the being of the organism – [granted that] an organism can only exist if it succeeds in finding in the world an adequate environment. (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p.13; cited in Varela et al. 1993, p.174)

In such an approach, perception is not embedded within and constrained by the surrounding world; it also contributes to the enactment of the surrounding world. The organism both initiates and is shaped by the environment, selecting relevant properties perceptually whilst the world selects the structure of the organism through its evolutionary history. Merleau-Ponty recognises that we must see the organism and environment as bound together in reciprocal specification and selection, what Varela et al. (1993) call perceptual guidance by action, we are perceptually guided by the tactile action of the whole body (not isolated sense modalities) enacting with the world. Varela et al. illustrates perceptual guidance by action through an analysis of Held and Heins`s kitten study (Held and Hein 1958):

> Held and Hein raised kittens in the dark and exposed them to light only under controlled conditions. A first group of animals were allowed to move around normally, but each of them were harnessed to a simple carriage and basket that contained a number of the second group of animals. The two groups therefore shared the same visual experience, but the second group was entirely passive. When the animals were released after a few weeks of this treatment, the first group of kittens behaved normally, but those who had been carried around behaved as if they were blind: they bumped into objects and fell over edges. (Varela 1993, p.175)

This example supports the enactive view that objects are not seen by the visual extraction of features but rather by the visual guidance of tactile bodily action, we cannot separate perception from action, from perceptually guided action, which incorporates the whole organism in the environment. Vision then, is much more than merely just the extraction of the visual; it is structured and supported by the rest of the tactile enactive experience, guided or supported by the enaction as a whole.

The view that vision is supported by other sense modalities is widely accepted within psychology and cognitive science. Bahrick and Lickliter (2000) proposed an intersensory redundancy hypothesis, which holds that in

early infant development, information presented redundantly and in temporal synchrony across two sensory modalities selectively recruits infant attention and facilitates perceptual learning more effectively than does the same information presented unimodally. The same event presented to one sense modality alone selectively recruits attention to modality-specific aspects of the event and facilitates perceptual learning of those properties at the expense of others. In such theories, as long as the 'redundant' information is 'matched' or 'synchronised' (i.e Audio that corresponds to the visual information) it is generally suggested that Audio information would enhance learning if it were complimentary to the visual channel. When the two channels were concordant, viewers were somewhat able to treat audio visual presentation as a single source. Bahrick and Lickliter (2000) recently showed that five-month-old infants could differentiate between two five-element rhythms (of hammers hitting a surface) when the rhythms were presented bi-modally, (audio and video) but showed no evidence of differentiating the rhythms when they were presented unimodally (video only). These studies all agree that Auditory information redundantly supports the visual channel, and as such aids in comprehension and learning.

These studies show quite effectively that it is much more than the visual extraction of human experience that is perceived through the visual. Held and Heim`s kitten study show us that the visual is guided by the tactility (movement and touch) of bodily action, whilst the studies of audio visual redundancy maintain that the perception of the visual extraction is redundantly supported by the auditory channel. The perception of the visual then, within an enacted model of perception, can no longer be understood as a mere isolated visual extraction, but as a part of an interrelated whole, supported by the rest of the enactive experience.

Looking beyond the Audio Visual

Whilst the biological models of vision moved away from the linguistically constrained relative models to involve the body as a site of meaning, an enactive approach to perception holds that Vision cannot be isolated from the enacted whole experience of the body enacting *in* the environment. As vision is shown to be both audibly and tactilely supported by the individual enaction, it is the individual enaction (or its history of structural coupling) as a whole that in turn supports the perception of the visual. The visual cannot be isolated from a subjective, enactive narrative of the perceiver. The visual is supported by and is a part of a whole enacted experience; as such the perception of visual images must contain elements of the individual's enactive history. To look is to perceive with the whole bodily experience in a

reciprocal attachment to the world, which is not just an isolated visual extraction.

Gombrich alluded to such a process by which the Beholder of the image had their own share in the visual representations that were depicted within them. The Beholder's Share (Gombrich 1964, pp.174-175) spoke of the incompleteness of painting arousing the bodily based Imagination of the beholder, what is not depicted within these types of image arouses the beholders expectations and experiences, thus 'completing' the images through the beholders own experience. He believed that Classical forms of art understood, better than most, the means of arousing this 'Imitative Faculty', in particular the art of the Far East had mastered this process of what he called 'giving expression to the invisible' (Gombrich 1960, p.175), he notes how, specifically, Chinese art theory discusses the power of expressing through *absence* of brush and ink. Within such images, intimate details such as facial features are absent, but the expressive marks that are present are enough to express what is absent from the depiction:

> Figures, even though painted without eyes, must seem to look; without ears, must seem to listen [...] There are things which ten hundred brushstrokes cannot depict but which can be captured by a few simple strokes if they are right. That is truly giving expression to the invisible. (Gombrich 1960, pp.174-175)



Figure 20. Images From the 'Mustard Seed Garden Manual of Painting' (from Gombrich 1960, p.175).

Gombrich believed that it is precisely the restricted visual language (with calligraphic qualities) of Eastern artwork of this period that encouraged the beholder to complete the image by arousing their imagination (see figure 20). In such a theory the empty surface is as much a part of the image as the

strokes of the brush, as the empty space arouses the beholders share in the perception of the image.

Such a process is found within the Western Medium of comics, the visual activity of `reading` the visual panels is generally accepted to be a process by which we combine individual image panels that exist in the same instant to create a continuous narrative by adding our own imagination. (McCloud 1993) Within this field, the dominant concept of Closure (McCloud 1993 et al), borrowed from film studies, has been used to describe this process of reading comics as the process of 'observing the parts but perceiving the whole.' (McCloud 1993) In which we observe the images, but perceive a whole narrative. Pratt describes the process of closure in relation to comics as 'The mental process whereby readers of comics bridge the temporal and spatial incompleteness of the diegesis that occurs in the gutters between panels, thereby participating in the creation of narrative.' (Pratt 2009) The concept of closure applied to comics, is used to describe our ability to view individual images and panels in sequence and to mentally construct or bridge together a narrative ourselves within the blank spaces, or gutter, between the panels from our own experience;

> In the limbo of the gutter, human imagination takes two separate images and transforms them into a single idea. Nothing is seen between the two panels, but experience tells you something must be there [..] Closure allows us to connect [otherwise unconnected] moments and mentally construct a continuous, unified reality. (McCloud 1993, p.89)

It is in the spaces in between the panels that allow the reader to construct the narrative out of their own imagination. There is nothing visual in between the panels to be read but white space, but our experience joins the panels together through a mental construction of a new continuous reality. It is not the images in the panels that create the overall narrative; it is the space in-between the panels (the gutter) that facilitate the creation of narrative by the readers own imagination. It is in this space between the pictures that the imagination of the reader, an imagination that utilises the rest of the sensory apparatus of the reader, supports of the visual images that are perceived (McCloud 1993, p.89).



Figure 21. Closure demonstrated within the medium of comics. (from McCloud 1993, p.89).

The visual images in the panels are supported by the `closure` that exists within the gutter, that is created by the experience of the reader and `soldered` to the visual in the panels. Thus within the context of narrative of comics, the visual perception of the panels is supported by the reader's own experience, an experience which as McCloud points out, constitutes more than just the visual, as all of the senses are involved. McCloud presents his multi-sensory notion of closure by providing an example of being in a kitchen environment as a sequence of visual panels.

In these images (figure 21) we have no problem with perceiving that we are in a kitchen. With a high degree of closure we can take these individual picture fragments and construct a continuous scene of a kitchen out of them, adding our own experience using the rest of the primary senses into the narrative mix. McCloud notes how the we can `hear` the boiling pot, not just in the first panel, but as the panels change, accompanied by the sound of the knife on the chopping board as the second frame is viewed and finished off with the ticking of the timer in the last panel. He notes how we can almost *smell* the food being cooked in the kitchen, even *feel* it or *taste* it. The visual images here are supported by the `closure` that exists within the gutter, that is created by the experience of the individual reader and `soldered` to the visual in the panels. Thus within the context of narrative of comics, the visual is supported by the reader's experience, which constitutes much more than the visual. The assumed mono-sensory (visual) medium of comics (McCloud 1993) then, is supported by the rest of the sensory experience in between the visual panels. When we view these we are aware of the aural, the olfactory, the tactile and the kinaesthetic at the same time as the visual.



Figure 22. Kitchen scene as constructed through the narrative of a comic (from McCloud 1993, p.89).

The sequence of visual panels that constitute a comic, combined with the reader's ability to use closure, conveys far more information than is assumed to be present within the visual. The comic's medium itself does not have any sound, music or motion, but these elements are surely perceived through this seemingly visual only media. These examples demonstrate that the assumed mono-sensory (visual) perceptual nature of the image in fact constitutes much more of our enactive experience than we are aware of. The visual in these examples is redundantly supported by elements of the rest of the individual enaction, be it the audible, tactile or olfactory experience, as such when the images are 'read' we view the visual individual 'parts' but perceive the 'enacted whole' which constitutes much more than the isolated visual, it constitutes the collective experience of the whole of the enacted experience.

Looking and the 'Audiovisual'

As Merleau-Ponty suggested, 'The properties of the object and the intentions of the subject [...] are not only intermingled; they also constitute a new whole. When the eye and the ear follow an animal in flight, it is impossible to say 'which started first' in the exchange of the stimuli and responses.' (Varela el al. 1993, p.175) It is impossible, in an enacted approach to perception, to understand vision in isolation from the rest of the enacted experience as is assumed within linguistic models. To look through the gaze of the culturally relative model of the linguistic turn is to dis-embody vision, to cut it off from the very system of enactive experience that defines it and supports it. The studies above show, quite subtly, that we can no longer talk of the visual, the tactile or the audio as isolated modes. Within the enactive view the visual is supported by the rest of the enactive experience, guided or

supported by the enaction. It is this guidance by action – action of the whole body not reduced to individual sensi-motor modes that guides vision in the enactive view. Here, talking of the visual, vision can no longer be isolated and privileged over any other part of the whole enaction, as it is a self supportive system, to talk of vision or the visual we must involve the rest of the enaction. Furthermore, each of the studies above has taken a position of the visual being redundantly supported by other modes, (the audio redundantly supporting the visual, the 'imagination' of the gutter guiding the visual panels, action guiding vision) thus privileging the visual over the other modes of the enaction as a focus of enquiry. However, to talk of the visual as privileged here is to create a further extraction, to detach it from the enaction that supports it and which it in turn supports. The evidence of supportive redundancy of audio-visual technologies therefore, supports here a much broader and subtle argument, that of the possibility of the individual sense modalities being redundantly supported by (and dependent upon) the rest of the enacted experience, and vice versa as a whole system with equal importance, not reducible to any single sense modality. Aristotle's original notion of Aisthesis, whilst not privileging any one modality, may have missed a fundamental point; to recognise the synaesthesic quality of the senses, but to extract and isolate the senses even further by talking of the 'tactile quality' of experience that underlies all the senses, thus privileging the tactile. In a true enactive approach there exists no division of the sense experience – experience exists as a supported whole and is only ever privileged by a sense through our objectified analysis of it. It is not, then, that there exist a number of sense modalities (that may or may not be tactile in nature), but that perception cannot be classified in terms of any currently known sense modalities. We cannot talk of the tactile nature, or the visual nature, or the aural nature, for these are further extractions which misguide an analysis. It is my impulse that they all constitute an interconnected whole, a self-supported entity existing on a very different plane - a further dimension of interrelated experience that supports itself and creates perception. Thus to survey this new dimension, a new model of analysis is called for. To begin to talk of the audio visual within a true enacted view of perception, we must re-attach the visual and audio to the enacted roots as a whole, and theorise as a whole. The visual and audio are no longer seen as individual sense modalities, but rather they must be treated as a single source, symbiotically attached to each other and to the rest of the enaction. To begin to survey this theoretical ground, to gain a foot hold on this new sensual dimension, we can now begin to talk of the constituted wholes that may exist on this new plane. To begin to understand what we have called the `visual`, or what we are trying to call natural looking, we must forget the dogmatic term visual, releasing looking from the grip of the visual, and fashion a new mode of reference that exists as a part of this enactive dimension, one that is not merely the visual or the aural or even the tactile, but maybe a configuration of

them all, one attempt may be to move beyond the visual toward a model of experience that may encompass more just the visual, for this we need to construct a field theory of the "audiovisual".

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